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one year from date of default, the court, in the absence of a
showing of sufficient cause, shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned. Reasoning that the purpose of third-party practice is to
expedite the termination of an action, the court held that the one
year period for entering a default judgment in a third-party action
commences when the judgment against the defendant in the main
action is rendered, since the cause of action in indemnity does not
accrue until then.
As one commentator has noted,77 any other result than that
reached by the court, would be impractical, if not impossible. Any
damages to which the third-party plaintiff may be entitled are
not ascertainable and nonrecoverable until after judgment is rendered against the third-party plaintiff. If the one year period were
to commence from the return date of the answer, the result
would be to require a third-party plaintiff to prove a case in which
no loss has been or may be incurred by him.78
ARTICLE

50-

JUDGMENTS

GENERALLY

CPLR 5013: Evasive tactics may allow dismissal on merits before
close of plaintiff's case so as to bar second suit.
CPLR 5013 is the seminal provision for the determination
of whether a judgment dismissing a cause of action is on the
merits and, thus, a bar to any subsequent action. It provides,
in part, that unless expressly specified otherwise, the dismissal of
a cause of action before the close of the proponent's case is not a
dismissal on the merits. Usually, the problem will not arise, since
the courts are loathe to dismiss on the merits before the proponent's proof is complete, especially where the grounds for dismissal are technical.7 9 Additionally, the mere statement that the
dismissal is on the merits or with prejudice is not conclusive as
to whether the second action is barred. Either the circumstances
in the prior-*action must warrant the conclusion that the dismissal
is on the merits, or it must be clear that the trial court intended
such a result.80 For example, in Mink v. Keim.,8' the plaintiff
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3215, supp. commentary 237 (1967).
75 An additional aspect of the present case is that, under certain factual
77See

conditions, the five-day notice prerequisite to a CPLR 3215 motion may
be ignored. The court here found that such a formality would not be
mandated when the third-party defendant has disregarded all prior notices,
including
one advising him of possible default.
79 Greenberg v. DeHart, 4 N.Y2d 511, 151 N.E.2d 891, 176 N.Y.S.2d
344 (1958); Richard v. American Union Bank 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E.
532 (1930); Jones v. Merit Truck Renting Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 779,
232 N.Y.S.2d 519 (lst Dep't 1962).
80 5 WEINsTmN, KoRn & MILLER, NEw YORK CIVIL PRAcTIcE t 5013.02

(1965).
81291 N.Y. 300, 52 N.E.2d 444 (1943).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

brought a second action after the first had been dismissed "on
the merits." The Court of Appeals held that where the plaintiff
had offered no additional proof, the mere fact of dismissal indicated nothing more than a non-suit. The addition of the words
"on the merits" added virtually nothing to the claim that the
second action was barred.
In the recent case of Palmer v. Fox,12 the plaintiffs failed to
comply with defendant's demand for a bill of particulars and a
ten-day conditional preclusion order was granted. When the plaintiffs made no attempt to comply with the order, the complaint was
dismissed "on the merits." The plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted
to vacate the dismissal. Subsequently, the plaintiffs served a second
complaint for the same cause of action.
The appellate division, fourth department, dismissed the complaint, noting that the plaintiffs brought the second action primarily
to circumvent the effect of the preclusion order granted in the
first action. Emphasizing that the power to bar a second suit
should be "sparingly exercised," the court noted that the plaintiffs'
evasive tactics constituted the "exceptional circumstances" contemplated by CPLR 5013 which would warrant such a dismissal
of the first suit prior to the completion of the plaintiffs' case
as would bar the second action herein brought.
ARTICLE 52-ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5201:

Seider v. Roth again held constitutional
by lower court.

The many facets of the problem created by Seider v. Roth8 3
again came to light in the recent case of Lefcuurt v. Seacrest Hotel
& Motor Inn, Inc.84 There, the obligation of defendant's insurer,
licensed and doing business in New York, to investigate, defend,
indemnify, and make medical payments constituted the res in New
York by which jurisdiction was obtained. The defendant alleged
a violation of due process and equal protection guarantees for
two reasons: he had no property which could be deemed a res
within the State, and CPLR 320(c) was unfair in making submission to personal jurisdiction a requisite to a defense on the
merits.
On plaintiff's motion, the Supreme Court, Queens County,
dismissed the objection relating to the lack of a res within the
8228 App.

Div. 2d 968, 283 N.Y.S.2d 216 (4th Dep't 1967).

83 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). For a prior
discussion of the constitutionality of Seider, see The Quarterly Survey of
New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 130, 157 (1967), discussing
Jones v. McNeil,

County 1966).

51 Misc. 2d 527, 273 N.Y.S2d 517

84 54 Misc. 2d 376, 282 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup.

(Sup. Ct. Albany

Ct. Queens County 1967).

